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Wyclif on Rights 
Stephen E. Lahey 
In the study of medieval political philosophy the tendency has been to pay 
attention to thinkers who appear to have contributed to the birth of the modem. 
While the value in coming to understand how modem political thought devel- 
oped is undeniable, this tendency is accompanied by an implicit, perhaps unin- 
tentional, devaluation of the study of that which did not contribute as obviously 
to modernity. In the history of the idea of the natural right scholars have distin- 
guished between the objective and the subjective right, characterizing the sub- 
jective right as what lies at the heart of the classically modem and liberal. One 
could get the impression that the good political philosophers, having hit upon 
the subjective right, dispensed with talk of the old-fashioned objective right 
just as people abandoned gaslight when Edison's lightbulb went on the mar- 
ket.' But this is not what happened; not only did objective rights discourse 
continue into the modem period, but it was not necessarily the idiom solely of 
religious and political conservatives. 
Some late medieval philosophers, notably Marsilius of Padua, even came 
up with progressive and unorthodox political visions while adhering to the 
objective right. I will show that at least one late medieval political theory founded 
on the objective right, that of John Wyclif, can be argued to be as innovative in 
several important aspects as that of any of the better-known fourteenth-century 
advocates of the subjective right. To do that, I will divide this paper into three 
parts. In the first, I will explain the difference between objective and subjective 
theories of the right, making note of what we can reasonably expect from a 
fourteenth-century political theory in the way of toleration and briefly intro- 
ducing John Wyclifs life and works. In the second I will recount Wyclifs view 
of ius, or the right, as it appears in his political writings, and in the third I will 
explain how this concept has a bearing on elements in his political thought that 
are recognizably unorthodox and even tolerant to modem, liberal eyes. Having 
'See Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge, 
1979), and Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 1978). 
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shown how Wyclif's objective right plays out in his innovative and reformative 
political scheme, I hope to have helped to dispel the dogma that the only early 
rights theories worth studying are those that evolved into ones we use. 
I.a. Objective and Subjective Rights 
The explicit distinction between objective and subjective rights is a new 
one, invented by scholars of the history of political thought to distinguish be- 
tween the sense of the term ius, or right, as that which is just in accordance with 
a set body of law, and the sense of ius which refers to a licit power or faculty 
belonging to an individual in accordance with right reason.2 The objective right 
is grounded in Roman law and functioned in medieval legal and political thought 
as it had in antiquity. Generally, an individual had a ius to act or be acted upon 
if that action was commensurate with the law. Among the Romans, that law 
was either Roman law, or it was according to objective natural law; with the 
introduction of Christian monotheism, the ius was "right" according to God's 
law. Tuck notes that the concept of dominium had long been of a piece with 
objective ius and explains that dominium had usually been seen as a species of 
objective ius. If someone has just dominium over something, it is because their 
relation ofdominium is "(what is) right," ius, in accord with justice, iustitia. He 
argues that when dominium, which he understands tomean "property," is equated 
with ius, "right," the foundation is laid for a possessive (subjective) right.3 
While this is problematic on several counts, not the least of which is the restric- 
tion of dominium to the ownership of property, it illustrates the relatedness of 
the two concepts ius and dominium.4 
As juristic sophistication grew in the twelfth century, it became useful to 
distinguish between ius in re, "right in a thing," and ius ad rem, "right to a 
thing." If someone has a ius in re, they can use the thing and/or exercise do- 
minium over it justly without answering to anyone (save God). If someone has 
a ius ad rem, they have a claim to the thing, but they do not exercise dominium 
over it; they rely on the present dominus to fulfill their claim.5 This is not to say 
that ius in re was seen as a "right to dominium, for the jurists held that do- 
minium was a species of ius, allowing for there to be non-dominative iura in 
re."6 
2 See Brian Tierey, "Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, 1150- 
1250," History of Political Thought, 10 (1989), 615-46, and "Marsilius on Rights," JHI, 52 
(1991), 3-17. 
3 Tuck, 3. 
4 See Tierey, "Tuck on Rights: Some Medieval Problems," History of Political Thought, 
4 (1983), 429-41. 
5 Tuck, 14-15. 
6 See J. H. Bums, Lordship, Kingship, and Empire (Oxford, 1992). 
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The subjective ius is a different matter. In early modernity legal philoso- 
phers usually distinguished them from objective rights by referring to some- 
thing within the right-holder. Tierney notes that Grotius (c. 1625) describes 
objective rights in the usual fashion, "The word could mean 'what is just' (the 
preferred definition of Aquinas), or it could mean a kind of law, and in that 
sense ius naturale was a 'dictate of reason.' " But subjective rights were some- 
thing different," 'a moral quality of a person enabling one to have or do some- 
thing justly.' "7 
This is something like a faculty-including power over oneself-a liberty, 
or a claim one could make on other things or people. A. S. McGrade defines a 
subjective right as "an individual's legally recognized power or freedom with 
respect to some good."8 Subjective rights had begun to appear as early as the 
twelfth century, although it was the later thought of Ockham and Gerson that 
proved to be directly influential to the early moder thinkers.9 Tierney has 
noted that while neither Gerson nor Ockham described a twofold definition of 
ius as objective law and subjective right, Marsilius did make such a distinction 
in his definition inDefensorPacis II. 12.10.1 Although the purpose of Marsilius's 
distinction was to argue that an absence of subjective rights was the identifying 
mark of true Christian ministry, that he made the distinction is significant." 
I.b. "Progressive" Medieval Political Thought? 
A still-common view is that the medieval views of toleration and pro- 
gressivity were what early moder, classically liberal thinkers were reacting 
against. If we define toleration as willingness to allow the continued existence 
(if not flourishing) of ways of life differing from a prevalent standard and de- 
fine progressivity as a political tendency towards the elimination of inequities 
in the distribution of goods or power, so the story goes, we are unlikely to find 
either in medieval visions of social order. Further, so long as the centralized, 
hierarchical structure of medieval papalism monopolized the society's religion, 
7 Tierey refers to Grotius, De lure Belli et Pacis (1989), I, 1.4, 2, 621-22. 8 A. S. McGrade, "Rights, Natural Rights, and the Philosophy of Law," in N. Kretzmann, 
Jan Pinborg, A. Kenny (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cam- 
bridge, 1982), 742, n.32. 
9 See A. S. McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge, 1974). 
See also Janet Coleman, "Medieval Discussions of Property: Ratio and Dominium in Thir- 
teenth and Fourteenth-Century Political Thought and Its Seventeenth-Century Heirs," Politi- 
cal Studies, 33 (1985), 73-100, and A. S. McGrade, "Aristotle's Place in the History of Natural 
Rights," Review of Metaphysics, 49 (1996), 803-29. 
'0 Tierey, "Marsilius on Rights," 5. See also Cary Nederman, Community and Consent: 
The Secular Political Theory of Marsiglio of Padua's Defensor Pacis (Lanham, Md., 1995), 
34-35. 
" See Defensor Pacis, II, 14.6-14; II 12.13; II.13.9-10. 
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social change could only take place with the cooperation of priests for whom 
toleration or social progressivity represented a threat o their maintenance of 
power. Once the papal structure began to totter in the Protestant Reformation, 
the stage was set for the onset of moder theories of tolerance of diversity and 
for the eventual demise of the feudal class structure. 
A generation of scholars of medieval political theory have unmasked this 
fiction.12 Usually this case is made with thinkers who used the subjective natu- 
ral right, like Marsilius or Ockham, for whom the identification of church and 
state was to be avoided. A medieval social vision founded on an objective view 
of right characterized by a similarly unorthodox rejection of mechanisms like 
feudalism and priestly hegemony would be a noteworthy instance of moder 
values turning up in medieval garb. 
On the political evel, John Wyclif advocates two social classes-property 
owners (including those who use what others own) and those who live in apos- 
tolic poverty, owning nothing privately. He believes the duty of the just civil 
lord or king is to see that the apostolically poor, who are all members of the 
church, are supplied with alms necessary for acquiring the goods they share, 
and to protect their pure poverty. The king's duty is also to ensure that society's 
civil owners can live harmoniously together and with the apostolically poor, 
free from any threats. The co-existence of these two classes under the protec- 
tion of the king suggests an attitude of toleration towards property ownership, 
which Wyclif believes to be founded in Original Sin. Further, his doctrine of 
Grace-founded ominium requires the king to serve as moral exemplar for his 
subjects, to refrain from war for any reason but strictly defined defense of the 
realm, and to keep the nation's laws and taxes to a bare minimum. And given 
the still common social strictures of feudalism, Wyclif's argument that no civil 
dominium, including both property ownership and civil jurisdiction, can be 
granted in perpetuity overturns established feudal machinery. 
Wyclif's theology is remarkably anti-authoritarian. His attitude towards 
the standing ecclesiastical hierarchy is openly hostile, and he consistently holds 
that the only clerical concerns should be the spiritual welfare of the laity, that 
interest in material gain is evidence of unsuitability for the priesthood. In late 
fourteenth-century England the church controlled enough land, natural resources, 
12 See also Anthony Black, "Society and the Individual from the Middle Ages to Rousseau: 
Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory," History of Political Thought, 1 (Sum- 
mer, 1980), 145-66; James Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle 
Ages (Princeton, 1992); Alan Gewirth, "Philosophy and Political Thought in the Fourteenth 
Century," The Forward Movement of the Fourteenth Century (Columbus, 1961), 125-64; David 
Luscombe, "The State of Nature and the Origin of the State," Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy; Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Consitutional Thought 
1150-1650 (Cambridge, 1982). For premodem notions of toleration, see Cary Nederman and 
John C. Laursen, The Roots of Toleration in Europe, 1100-1700: Theory and Practice (Lanham, 
Md., 1997). 
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and bare political power for Wyclif's view to be truly incendiary. He also ar- 
gues that excommunication should never be an option for controlling church 
members, that Scripture must be available for clergy and laity alike, and that 
episcopal power be subordinate to the king, not the pope. 
IsWyclif's theory as tolerant as the better known Ockham or Marsilius? He 
rejects the idea that the consent of the governed has anything to do with the 
justice of the government,'3 speaks not at all of parliament and views a commu- 
nity of aristocrats as a bad source of civil legislation,'4 advocates suffering 
tyranny as a kind of general divine punishment so long as the tyrant does not 
unduly injure the church,15 and makes no bones about the church being a sig- 
nificant part of the state.16 On the face of it, fourteenth-century advocates of 
subjective natural right seem to deserve the praise for separation of church and 
state. But this does not mean that an advocate of objective right like Wyclif is 
without innovations and in the third section of this paper we will examine 
elements of secular and theological progressivity in light of his concept of 
objective ius. 
I.c. John Wyclif's Life and Works 
Had Wyclifremained where he was in 1373, history would remember him 
as among the last of the Oxford schoolmen, a Master of Balliol college and 
philosophically one of the most articulate opponents of the Moderni conceptu- 
alist ontology.17 Indeed, the recent edition of his De Universalibus of 1368-69 
reveals a satisfyingly sophisticated philosophical realism.18 But in 1374 Wyclif 
decided that it was time to turn from theoretical pursuits, and he began his 
politically and ecclesiastically reformative Summa Theologie.'9 This Summa 
was to launch a firestorm of controversy, initially involving Gregory XI, Urban 
VI, and John of Gaunt over Wyclifs fierce anti-papalism, which came to a 
head in controversial trials and eventually led to the heretical Lollard. 
Our interest lies in the first books of the Summa, where Wyclif describes 
the relation of God to creation, the Fall, and the optimum conditions for 
'3 De Civili Dominio [henceforth, DCD], I, xviii, p. 130. 6-14. 
14 Ibid., I, xxviii. 
15 Ibid., I, vi, 43; xxviii; De Officio Regis [henceforth, DOR], i, ii, iii, 52, viii, 201. 
16 DCD, I, xxviii; DOR, ii, vii. 
17 See H. B. Workman's John Wyclif: A Study of the English Church (Oxford, 1926). See 
also J. A. Robson, Wyclifand the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1966); Anne Hudson and Michael 
Wilks (eds.), From Ockham to Wyclif: Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 5 (London, 1987); 
and William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 
1987). 
18 John Wyclif, Tractatus de Universalibus, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford, 1985); On Uni- 
versals, tr. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1985). 
'9 De Dominio Divino [henceforth, DD], I, incipit, 1.6: "[T]empus mihi per totum re- 
siduum vite mee tam speculative quam practice, secundum mensuram quam Deus donaverit...." 
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postlapsarian humans. In De Dominio Divino Wyclif characterizes the relation 
of God to creation in terms of dominium, a portmanteau word which incorpo- 
rates the concepts of ownership and jurisdiction.20 Wyclif explains that God's 
dominium is the first, unmediated cause of all instances of created dominium 
and describes divine dominium as paradigmatic in its nutritive love (caritas) of 
its subjects.21 He further defines God's dominium as involving the truest kind 
of ownership; humans who have been given dominium in creation cannot lay 
claim to such a perfect relation.22 
Wyclif explores human dominium in De Statu Innocencie (1376), which 
gives a picture of the idyllic natural human dominium in Eden, and in De Civili 
Dominio (1376-77), which explains how just postlapsarian human dominium is 
possible. In both Wyclif contends that all human dominium is really on loan 
from God and that true human lords exercise this relation in and through a 
Grace-given caritas otherwise impossible for postlapsarian wills.23 
Wyclif believes that Grace is absolutely necessary for human lords to be 
just; without it the civil lord would become enmeshed in the worries conse- 
quent on ownership, inevitably lapsing into tyranny. Because a lord's jurisdic- 
tive authority is only possible through Grace, it follows that human justice is 
only possible when civil law is grounded in divine law.24 Yet Wyclif believes 
private property ownership to be an abomination, and that any institution founded 
upon it cannot possibly partake of God's justice.25 The dominium with which 
humans were created involved no "mine" and "thine" and was the relation meant 
to allow human participation in God's loving dominium over creation.26 Since 
this natural dominium was lost with the Fall, Wyclif might have argued that 
civil dominium can admit of Grace as a kind of substitue for the lost ideal. 
Rather, Wyclifbelieves that he Edenic natural dominium can be regained through 
Christ's redemption of Original Sin, and that all those favored by Grace are 
freed from the anxieties of private ownership.27 These Grace-favored natural 
lords, he explains, are the true members of the church, and deserve to be pro- 
tected from the hazards ofpost-lapsarian life by someone sufficiently powerful 
to overcome any threat. 
20 For dating Wyclifs writings, see Williel R. Thomson, The Latin Writings ofJohn Wyclyf 
(Toronto, 1983). 
21 DD, I, iii-vi. 
22 Ibid., I, ii, 11.24ff.; I, x, 65.13-75.32. 
23 De Statu Innocencie, vi; DCD, I, iv; III, xv. 
24 DCD, I, i, 1.1-3: "Ius divinum presupponitur iuri civili; Dominium naturale presupponitur 
dominio civili" See also Michael Wilks, "Predestination, Property, and Power: Wyclif's Theory 
of Dominion and Grace," Studies in Church History, II (London, 1965), 220-36. 
25 DCD, I, xxii, 155.17. 
26 DD, I, iii; De Statu Innocencie, vi; DCD, III, xiii. 
27 DCD, I, ix; III, i-xiii. 
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This is the place of the Grace-favored civil lord; he is qualified by Grace to 
enjoy restored natural dominium but must shoulder the responsibility of civil 
dominium on behalf of his fellows.28 Thus, a Grace-favored civil lord is neces- 
sary for the protection of the church and is enabled by Grace to recognize that 
his office is really one of stewardship on behalf of the divine lord and not truly 
jurisdictive ownership.29 
The church must submit to the Grace-favored civil lord's regulation as a 
patient submits to a physician. When the patient struggles, the physician does 
not quail but rather persists even if the patient believes the physician to be 
engaged in murder.30 The civil lord must serve as material vicar in the church, 
with full temporal powers over the kingdom. This amounts to a complete di- 
vestment of all of the church's material holdings, which would be disastrous 
were the civil lord not always conscious that he is only God's steward.31 
As mentioned, the outcome of this reformative prescription for society is 
two classes: the property-holding majority, including all who implicitly show 
their approval of proprietas through their use of private property, and the 
apostolically poor minority, who rely on the king for their material needs. The 
property-holding majority are not members of Christ's body on earth by virtue 
of their willingness to own property, and are damned, while the apostolically 
poor minority are those whom God foreknows to be saved. The civil lord or 
king is of this latter group and serves as the kingdom's hepherd and steward, 
caring for the saved and the damned alike. This is the general outline ofWyclifs 
social vision, from which flows his rejection of the feudal order, his condemna- 
tion of church-owned private property, and all that we will discuss below.32 
II. Wyclif on Rights 
While the ideal relation of Church and State in De Civili Dominio is de- 
scribed in terms of Grace-founded ominium, the idea's roots lie in the rights 
theory Wyclifhad already outlined inDe Mandatis Divinis. Williel R. Thomson 
dates the treatise, the first inWyclif's Summa Theologie, at 1375 or early 1376. 
Here Wyclif set out to show humans how to realize God's will for their actions, 
beginning with a consideration of ius and iustitia as it is knowable by hu- 
28 Ibid., I, xvii; xviii, 129; xxxviii, 265.29-266.4; see also DOR, x. 
29 DD, III, vi; DCD, I, xi; I, xxxvi; See also A.S. McGrade, "Somersaulting Sovereignty: 
a Note on Reciprocal Lordship and Servitude in Wyclif," in Diana Wood (ed.), The Church and 
Sovereignty, Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 9 (London, 1991), 261-68. 
30 DCD, I, xxxvii, 272-74. 
31 DCD, I, xi, 75; xxxiii, 231; xxxvi, 259; DOR, iv, 79. 
32 Wyclif can be construed as allowing for the righteousness of other property owners in 
DCD, III, vii-viii, where he argues that one's poverty in spirit is more important than one's 
poverty in ownership. 
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mans.33 Holding that Holy Scriptures are the most direct source of God's will 
for human action, he directs most of the treatise to an exegesis of the Decalogue.34 
My attention will be focused on Wyclifs explanation of why the nature of the 
right is found in Scripture and what its implications are for his rights language. 
At the outset ofDe Mandatis Divinis Wyclif explains that ius is a term used 
when something is just.35 To show that iustitia is an effect of being in accord 
with ius, Wyclif suggests we look at the three senses of the term ius. First, it is 
used to describe any real created nature justly exercised over a subject (servum), 
including the use of something/someone. Second, it is used to describe the 
power of a lord to use something/someone (aright of use). Finally, it is used to 
refer to the uncreated truth paradigmatic for all iustitia, "which some call the 
art of the fair and the good, and some a holy sanction, which commands the 
upright and forbids the opposite, but some more completely say that ius is the 
constant and perpetual will granting to each what is their own."36 
Some have used this last definition of iustitia, but incorrectly. We should 
recognize that iustitia is an effect of ius, for the only thing prior to iustitia 
according to the jurist's definition is the constant will to give to everyone their 
due. Can this constant will be anything other than ius? Here Wyclif is extrapo- 
lating from Justinian's Institutes, where in the first sentence the emperor begins 
with the working Roman definition of iustitia just given.37 Perhaps Wyclif is 
reasoning that if created iustitia is founded in a constant human will, the 
uncreated and purer divine iustitia must be founded in the divine will. If so and 
if one reads Justinian's definition "constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique 
tribuens" as presupposing a ius which is each person's due, it seems natural to 
conclude that God knows as he wills what is each person's due, which would 
make what is ius at least contemporaneous with divine willing and certainly 
prior to the iustitia consequent on perfect willing. 
Iustitia, Wyclif explains, is usually defined as a moral virtue, a habit; and 
because the divine will is not a habit but a person of the Trinity, ius must be 
prior to and causative of iustitia.38 This is not to say that Wyclif embraces the 
Aristotelian definition of iustitia but rather that the Aristotelians are wrong to 
33 De Mandatis Divinis (henceforth, DMD), I, 1.1-7. 
34 DMD, III, 21.13-25. 
35 DMD, I, 8-10. 
36 Ibid., 1.13-2.6: "Et tercio accipitur ius pro veritate increata omnem creatam iusticiam 
exemplante; quam quidam vocant artem equi et boni; et quidam dicunt quod est sanccio sancta, 
precipiens honesta et prohibens contraria; sed quidam dicunt complecius quod ius est constans 
et perpetua voluntas tribuens unicuique quod est suum." 
37 Justinian, Corpus luris Civilis, Vol.I, Institutiones, I.i. 1: "Iustitia est constans et perpetua 
volunta ius suum cuique tribuens. Iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, 
iusti atque iniusti scientia." 
38 Ibid., 2.7-16. 
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suppose that their version of iustitia could possibly be directive of uncreated 
ius. 
All created justice is a virtue of a rational creature, but no creature 
subjects any other through power to give up his right, so this descrip- 
tion does not match created justice; indeed, if any justice matches, it 
would be uncreated justice, in which coincide right, the just, and pure 
justice. This, then, is the order: the virtue of justice is founded in the 
rational creature by right, which is the simplest and first rule, which 
right is just formaliter. And by ... [this objective right] the works of 
humans are just, thus a human work is just by justice, as justice [is 
just] by right.39 
One might wonder why, if in God the just, the right, and justice are identi- 
cal, created justice would be causally dependent on the uncreated right. Why 
not on uncreated justice? Wyclif has made it clear that all that is just in creation 
happens because God wills it.40 While what happens is just, that it happens is 
right. Since God knows and wills that it happen, which knowing and willing is 
the uncreated "right," the acting that is taking place is just but that the action 
occur is right.41 
It is not surprising that Wyclif makes the argument that all created stan- 
dards of the right are as nothing in comparison to uncreated right, given his 
description of God's all-encompassing dominium in De Dominio Divino. What 
is remarkable ishis reference to ius as the just exercise of authority over or use 
of something/someone and also as the power of dominium or use. This sug- 
gests in one case a diversion from the objective right as it appears in Aquinas 
and in the other a potential sensitivity to the idea of the subjective ius, which is 
described by Marsilius as an act, power or habit.42 
Can we not explain both of these references as to traditional objective ius? 
Regarding the first sense, a created truth justly exercised over a subject, one 
could make the argument that this is in accord withAquinas's description of ius 
or iustum as "commensurate with another person according to some sense of 
39 Ibid., 2.17-3.2: "Item, omnis creata iusticia est virtus creature racionalis, sed nullius 
creature potestati subiacet unicuique ius suum tribuere; ergo dicta descripcio non competit 
create iusticie; immo si alicui iusticie conveniat, hoc erit iusticie increate, in qua ius, iustum 
atque iusticia mere coincidunt; et per consequns dicta descripcio iuri primo convenit. Iste ergo 
erit ordo: a iure, quod est simplicissima ac prima regula, infunditur creature racionali virtus 
iusticie, qua ipsa est iusta formaliter. Et ab hiis simul dicitur denominacione extrinseca opus 
hominis esse iustum, sic quod opus humanum fit iustum a iusticia, sicut iusticia fit a iure." 
40 DD, I, x, 74.5ff. 
41 DMD, I, 4.15-5.2. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, 57.1. 
42 See Defensor Pacis, 11.12, 10; see also Tierney, "Marsilius on Rights," 5. 
9 
Stephen E. Lahey 
fairness."43 But we should be clear about what sort of"created truth" is being 
justly exercised; the use of the term servum suggests dominium. Aquinas de- 
scribes the dominium relation as being a special sort of ius, like the parental 
ius. He says that the dominative ius detracts from the ius and iustum of the lord 
and the servant. 
A child precisely as such belongs to the father, and a slave pre- 
cisely as such belongs to the master. All the same, each, taken as an 
individual human being, subsists in himself and distinct from others. 
Each accordingly is an object of justice in some manner, inasmuch as 
each is a human being. Accordingly, laws are laid down regulating the 
dealings of father and child, and of master and slave. But to the extent 
that each belongs to another the full character of the right and the just 
is lacking.44 
The only way to claim that Wyclifs first description of ius is in reference to 
Aquinas's definition of objective right would be to hold that Wyclif saw ius as 
exclusively dominative, a bastardization of Aquinas's theory. Better to inter- 
pret this first description as a state of affairs between the holder and that/those 
over which the relation is held that has its "rightness" by virtue of its being 
exercised justly. Wyclif's reference to justice as a habit could correspond to this 
description; were someone to ask how the relation could be exercised justly, 
the response would be that the ius came from the practice of the moral virtue of 
justice on the part of the holder. 
But Wyclif has already argued that justice is founded not in some created 
or artificial system of thought but in the perfect justice of uncreated ius. The 
reference to justice as a habit is not his final word on the topic; in fact Wyclif 
believes such a description to be inadequate in reference to true justice. So his 
first description is of a rationally formulable created state of affairs commensu- 
rate with the ius of God's will. Briefly, what is truly right or just in human 
affairs depends on what is divinely right or just. Beyond that, Wyclifs inten- 
tion is hard to discern. 
The second description is quite different from the first; in this case ius is a 
lord's power to use. This appears to correspond to the Marsilian subjective 
right as being a power held by an individual and is evocative of the definitions 
43 Summa Theologicae, IIaIIae, 57, 2. 
44 Ibid., 57, 4: "Ad secundum dicendum quod filius, inquantum filius est aliquid patris; et 
similiter servus, inquantum servus est sliquid domini; uterque tamen, prout consideratur ut 
quidam homo, est aliquid secundum se subsistens ab aliis distinctum. Et ideo inquantum uterque 
est homo, aliquo modo ad eos est justitia; et propter hoc etiam aliquae leges dantur de his quae 
sunt patris ad filium, vel domini ad servum; sed inquantum uterque est aliquid alterius, secun- 
dum hoc deficit ibi perfecta ratio justi vel juris." 
10 
Wyclif on Rights 
which Tierey reports of the canonists.45 In this case individuals holding do- 
minium can choose to use that over which they exercise dominium. There are 
no strictures: Wyclif does not add, "according to the established laws of use 
regulating such dominium," nor does he say "in accordance with God's will." 
But he does restrict it to people who are lords, which is no longer a universal 
condition, given the Fall. Wyclif believed that humans were created with a 
natural dominium, a non-proprietative relation in which everyone could use 
what they needed of creation; but the Fall effectively ended this state.46 
Since anyone might be a lord with Grace, however, we cannot be satisfied 
that this is evidence for the absence of a subjective right. For now it is enough 
to note how the second description of ius implicitly refers to property owner- 
ship, orproprietas in dominium, and that this description could conceivably be 
understood as a kind of subjective right. Since Adam's fall what has been needed 
to have this power has been Grace; and since Wyclif devotes much more atten- 
tion to Grace as the primary foundation for dominium, we cannot conclude that 
he has erected his dominium theory on the basis of subjective rights. 
Christ's redemption allowed for the reintroduction of natural dominium 
into the world, but only the Grace-favored can now claim it.47 Wyclif identifies 
this class with the Christian church and argues that the clergy's propensity to 
private ownership has done great violence to Christ's redemption.48 Natural 
dominium is recoverable in apostolic poverty, and the Church must recover 
itself therein.49 The only people capable of divesting the Church of wealth 
without incurring blame are the Grace-favored, those whom the divine will has 
ordained must act as the Church's tewards. But if the Grace-favored are, as a 
class, natural lords who should be free of private ownership, Wyclif appears at 
cross purposes-who else is qualified to act? 
Wyclif's arguments in favor of the idea that some of the Grace-favored 
natural ords must set aside their restored birthright to take on the burden of 
civil dominium and reform the Church, while comprehensible in terms of his 
description of ius, exceed the scope of this discussion. For now it is enough to 
note that the second description of ius implicitly refers to property ownership, 
or theproprietas in dominium, and that this description could conceivably have 
been classifiable as a subjective right, had Adam not sinned. Wyclif takes no 
notice of this possibility in De Mandatis Divinis nor in De Statu Innocencie or 
De Civili Dominio, indicating that he either had not known of subjective rights, 
or that he was indifferent to them. 
45 See Tiemey, "Origins of Natural Rights Language," 629-38. 
46 See esp. De Statu Innocencie, III, 491.15-18. 
47 DCD, I, ix, 62.9-13. 
48 DCD, III, i-xi. 
49 Ibid., xiii. 
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The next step is to explain how properly to use the term ius, which he does 
in chapter 3 of De Mandatis Divinis. Here he takes the distinction between 
uncreated and created right of chapter 1 and provides the basis for the doctrine 
of Grace-founded dominium by showing all conceptions of created right to be 
reliant on uncreated right. He begins by making use of the distinction between 
ius in re and ius ad rem, asserting the canonists' dictum that "it is impossible to 
have a right to a thing unless you already have a right in a thing."50 All rational 
creatures can only have things by right and title through God's willing, the 
most powerful right. "If the giving of a temporal lord makes the receiver have 
the right [to the gift] from the giver, how much greater is the giving of the Lord 
of lords...."51 
This remark about a lord's giving is a reference to Wyclifs discussion of 
the directive force of God's giving and of its necessity for all created acts of 
giving in De Dominio III, chapters 1 and 2.52 God's act of giving takes nothing 
from His own dominium and is the only means by which any created being is 
able to have existence. If this is the case with existence, it must be with any 
right a created being might have to use or exercise dominium over another; so 
in order for someone to have a right to use or dominium, they must first have 
been given this use or dominium by God. Wyclif likens this reliance of human 
use and dominium upon the divine giving to the relation of steward to master. 
"Just as the steward of a temporal lord who distributes from his lord the proper 
gifts ofdominium does not give them of himself, but dispenses them [on behalf 
of his master], so it is with the giving of any creature."53 
This reference allows him to distinguish ius from dominium by claiming 
that ius causally precedes dominium; one cannot have dominium over some- 
thing without first having a ius in re. What of the possibility that this would 
preclude any creature from either acquiring or destroying their right, since their 
having the right is eternally established in the divine will? Wyclif assumes that 
his readers are familiar with his discussion of the non-deterministic nature of 
God's perfect knowing in De Dominio Divino, I, chapters 14-19.54 There, his 
distinction between absolute necessity, truths which cannot not be and neces- 
sity ex suppositione, truths having an eternal cause from which their temporal 
being flows formally, allows Wyclif to hold that God's knowing and willing is 
50 DMD, III, 15.20-23: "[I]mpossibile est tamen aliquem habere ius ad rem, nisi habuerit 
ius in re pro suo tempore et econtra." 
51 Ibid., 16.1-3 "Si enim donacio domini temporalis facit ius donatorio ad donatum, quanto 
magis donacio domini dominorum...." 
52 See esp. DD, III, I, 199.19. 
53 Ibid., III, I, 206.7: "Sicut ergo dispensator terreni dominii manualiter tradendo dominia 
domini donantis proprie non donat ea tam proprie, sed dispensat; sic est de donacione cuiuslibet 
creature." 
54 Ibid., I, xiv-xix, 115-72. 
12 
Wyclifon Rights 
necessary ex suppositione and so not fatally deterministic.5 So Wyclif con- 
cludes that people can deserve through Grace just use of possessions, and power 
to that use, both of which differ from dominium.56 Not that Wyclif is suggesting 
that people cannot deserve dominium through Grace; his desire is to show how 
ius and dominium are distinct, and here he has shown that people can merit 
non-dominative rights to things through God's having given them rights in 
things. 
He notes that he has made use of three senses of the term ius in the context 
of this discussion. 
Three kinds of right are ordained essentially: the right which is 
divine willing, the right which is the power over the usable, and the 
right which is the use. The second of these cannot exist unless the first 
precedes it eternally, nor can the third exist unless the second precedes 
it in time or in nature.57 
This is a reordering of the three senses of ius; now that we are clear about heir 
applicability, he appears to be saying, we can arrange them properly. Here 
Wyclif distinguishes between the ability to use or forbear from using an object 
and the actual use of the object in referring to the right which is the power over 
the usable and the right which is the use. It is not likely that Wyclif had this 
distinction in mind when he listed the uses of ius in Chapter 1, for both of the 
first two senses in the first description are formulated to allow distinguishing 
between potential and actual use. Still, the second sense in the earlier list looks 
like "power over the usable," and "use" in this section might conceivably be 
what Wyclif had in mind by "justly exercising truth." 
At this point Wyclif refers to any sort of ius that is not either uncreated ius 
in re or ius ad rem as mere pretenses, and he compares these supposed human 
rights to true, uncreated rights as analogous to the difference between posses- 
sion of something by dominium and possession by use. It is easy to say that one 
possesses something without being specific as to what grounds allow the pos- 
session. One can justly point to a thing and say, "That is mine!" without anyone 
asking whether the speaker is owning or renting (enjoying the use of) it. But 
such customary linguistic usage obscures the nature of things. If someone has 
55 Ibid., 115-25; also Tractatus de Universalibus, xiv, 54ff. See also Anthony Kenny, 
"Realism and Determinism in Early Wyclif," ed. Anne Hudson, Studies in Church History, 5 
(Oxford, 1987), 165-78. 
56 DMD, iii, p.16.20-24. 
57 Ibid., 16.24-28: "Patet eciam quod ista tria iura essencialiter ordinata sunt; ius quod est 
volicio divina, ius quod est potestas ad usibile, et ius quod est usus; sic quod secundum non 
potest esse, nisi primum eternaliter precesserit, nec tercium potest esse, nisi secundum 
precesserit empore vel natura." 
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the right to a thing, he has it because God wills it, which cannot be contro- 
verted; likewise, if someone possesses a thing by dominium, he cannot give it 
up or have it rightfully taken away.58 
Consequently, all human legislation and jurisdiction must be conducted by 
people with an understanding of uncreated ius. Philosophers who rely on hu- 
man reason unguided by Scripture cannot be expected to point to just society, 
and when scriptural guidance is abandoned, iniquity is the only possible re- 
sult.59 Those legislators who strive to incorporate God's will in their work re- 
quire Grace because God must will that they succeed before they do. From here 
Wyclif's analysis ofjust human jurisdiction in De Civili Dominio and De Offi- 
cio Regis begins. 
Having shown the causal necessity of uncreated iura for just law-making, 
we should consider whether Wyclif means that just legislators can create laws 
that would themselves establish just created (objective) iura. That is, if uncreated 
right is necessary for the law-makers to legislate justly, do the created objective 
rights that result from their legislation have any claim to the justice of that 
legislation? Given that created rights based in human legislation unfounded in 
Scripture cannot be just, can any created right be just?6 
So long as created ius is regulated according to uncreated ius it is just, and 
an expression of the divine will. But if the necessary condition for justice in 
created ius is founded in uncreated ius, who is capable of establishing whether 
a given created ius is so founded? As already indicated, only the Grace-favored 
are, which suggests that a legislator's ubjects who are not Grace-favored can- 
not realize the justice of their legislator's actions. So government by consensus 
would be foreign to Wyclif.61 But it would also suggest that anybody who is 
Grace-favored could assess the quality of the ruler's legislation. Wyclif would 
not deny this but argues instead that the Grace-favored should be concerned 
more with spiritual perfection than with the mundane concerns of civil legisla- 
tion.62 Thus the Grace-favored legislator would be taking on a grievously op- 
pressive burden by becoming a civil lord. This sacrifice reflects the servile 
nature of civil dominium, for the Grace-favored civil lord is really the steward 
of the divine Lord, as the ius resultant from his legislation is really a created 
participation in uncreated ius. 
Wyclif notes that created ius has proven to be divisible by those not aware 
of the priority of uncreated ius, and he ends his discussion of rights with a brief 
summary of these divisions. This summary is in concert with the medieval 
Aristotelian division of created civil power, and the unwary reader might pre- 
58 Ibid., 18.1-16. 
59 Ibid., 22.1. 
60 Ibid., 23.5. 
61 DCD, I, xviii, 130.6-14. 
62 DOR, VI, 133.16-30. 
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sume Wyclif to be grounded in Aristotle. This is easily dispelled by recalling 
Wyclif's belief that the Aristotelian view of justice as moral virtue does not 
sufficiently account for the directive power of uncreated ius. 
One can explain created ius in two ways, he begins; the first is by dividing 
up sorts of ius according to the different nations in which they appear. Some 
rights are Roman, while others are English. But this confusion of variation and 
contrast is of no use to theorists.63 Better is a description based in the rhythms 
of created nature. At its most basic, created ius governs the proliferation and 
structural development of everything in creation. Among humans, this under- 
lying ius is called ius gentium, whereby all agree that it is right for people to 
live virtuously, to marry for procreation, and to live socially to maximize the 
rationally comprehensible order.64 
Less generally defined is the final species of created ius, whereby human 
reason regulates societies in conformity with the primary right called domestic, 
civil or political right. In some cases, he notes, its ideal development is aristoc- 
racy, while among others it is democracy, "according to the virtues, the riches, 
or according to political nobility or the election of the people...."65 Philoso- 
phers can divide the political laws that come from these varying methods of 
rule as being common and public, or private laws. Of these divisions Wyclif 
has nothing more to say, referring his reader to the third book of Aristotle's 
Politics. 
We have already seen how Wyclif rejects Aristotle's lack of foundation in 
uncreated ius, and so need only note this description's assumption of reliance 
of such an arrangement upon the uncreated ius of God's will. Wyclif makes no 
significant use of this potential development of ius into aristocracy or democ- 
racy in any later works, framing his description of just human government in 
monarchic terms without reference to constitutions organized according to the 
needs of the governed. Why, then, this reference to the types of government 
described in the Politics? It is possible that he had not yet developed his mon- 
archism when he wrote De Mandatis Divinis, but it is more likely that he felt 
the need to avoid framing the discussion of the decalogue that was to follow in 
exclusively monarchist terms, given the relatively late development of king- 
ship in the history of Israel. 
Wyclif's view of rights, then, is of a created, objective right wholly reliant 
upon the ius of divine will; an individual has a ius to usus or dominium if and 
only if God wills that the individual have it. Artificed systems of the assign- 
ment of rights not founded in God's will as revealed in Scripture are fictions in 
which true ius appears only accidentally. His formulation of this position is 
63 DMD, III, 23.23-27. 
64 Ibid., 24.1-17. 
65 Ibid., 11.20-23. 
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sufficiently complex as to admit of a distinction between ius in re and ius ad 
rem and to hold its own in contrast with a more conventional framework. 
III. Toleration in Wyclif's Political Thought 
Wyclif's vision of the harmonious coexistence of private property owners 
with the apostolically poor indicates a willingness to tolerate the institution of 
private property ownership, despite it's roots in human sin. This alone can be 
argued to indicate a vein of progressivity in Wyclif's approach, since, unlike 
many of his contemporaries who accepted Aristotle's view of private property 
as natural and rational, he felt it to be neither natural nor rational. Several ideas 
follow from this that suggest a kinship with later social reform movements. 
Among these are, first, the moral restraint that characterizes the Grace-favored 
civil lord's rule; second, Wyclif's rejection of biological hereditary succession 
as a means by which dominium (civil ownership and rule) is conferred upon the 
civil lord; third, his belief that a lord's subjects ought to be free to reprove their 
lord; and finally, Wyclif's distrust of excessive reliance on a multitude of laws, 
courts, and lawyers. 
An acceptance of civil ownership upon which the secular state is erected 
indicates Wyclif's readiness to provide for the ugly realities of postlapsarian 
life. Not only ought the Grace-favored civil lord avoid harming property own- 
ers, Wyclif counsels the civil lord to protect and nourish the commonwealth. 
This protection might involve severe measures; when invasion threatens the 
well-being of the kingdom, for example, the king ought do what he can to 
protect all citizens, even if this involves dismantling cathedrals or churches to 
use the stones for battlements.66 To insure a healthy economy and the likeli- 
hood of fair financial transactions, the king should regulate the kingdom's 
merchants to prevent escalation of interest rates.67 Further, the king's regula- 
tion must prevent the lesser property owners and non-apostolic users from 
indigency and protect debtors from unreasonable punishment for failure to re- 
pay because of fire, shipwreck, or robbery.68 
The moral purity of the Grace-favored civil lord is embodied in the lord's 
caritas, which is expressed as love for his subjects; the selfishness of the domi- 
neering owner is foreign to just civil dominium.69 A chief characteristic of this 
caritas is the tendency for the civil lord to act towards his subjects as if they 
were his masters and to govern according to the needs of the governed, not 
66 DOR, viii, 185.9-21. 
67 DCD, III, xvi, 311-313. 
68 DOR, v, 96.16-27; De Ecclesia, xi, 243.11-21. 
69 DCD, I, xxiii, 227-231; xxxvi, 259. 
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those of the governor.70 Grace will allow the civil lord to serve as a moral 
exemplar for his kingdom, a standard according to which the subjects ought 
model their own actions.71 So long as the king's life is exemplary, Wyclif be- 
lieves, the subjects will know that they are being ruled by the Grace-favored, 
and will be inclined to live in imitation of their lord; but should the king serve 
as a model of depravity, the entire kingdom must surely be mired in depravity 
as well.72 
Chief among the means by which a kingdom deteriorates is the institution 
of hereditary succession. God can never countenance the inheritance of civil 
ownership because the concept of Grace-favored dominium requires that civil 
owners merit their office through purity of will. This line of argument is par- 
ticularly remarkable given its fourteenth-century context. Wyclif argues not 
only that monarchy should find a non-dynastic way to pass on its responsibili- 
ties, but also that there should be an end to perpetual grants, through which a 
king rewards a favored servant with a gift of land or service to be passed on to 
the servant's children in perpetuity, and of hereditary servitude, where a slave's 
children are themselves forced into slavery.73 What this amounts to is a rejec- 
tion of the feudal apparatus that had come to characterize medieval England. 
How to provide for the right person being made king, if not through dynas- 
tic inheritance? Certainly not through popular elections, Wyclif argues, be- 
cause the sins of the electors are likely to affect the outcome of the election, 
despite the best of intentions. Neither inheritance nor election are reliable, be- 
cause for every Solomon who has inherited his throne there is a Nero, and for 
every Lincoln who has been popularly elected there has been a Hitler. "Thus 
since acquiring the title itself does not suffice, but clearly needs a title of char- 
ity superadded, it is clear also that neither hereditary succession nor popular 
election suffice in themselves either."74 
Better to be more careful about the relation of filiation, for the problem 
with inheritance is that one's natural son might not be Grace-favored. Filiation 
through instruction in Christ is more likely to provide the proper means by 
which an appropriate heir to the kingship may be selected. "The title of do- 
minium by law of heredity in Christ is naturally more prior and continually 
more requisite after the Fall than any other mode of dominium."75 If the heir to 
70 Ibid., I, xxxiv, 243.13-33. 
71 Ibid., I, xx; xxvi; DOR, iii, 46-49; iv, 80. 
72 Ibid., iii, 48; Wyclif's reference here is to Proverbs 1:7. 
73 DCD, I, xxix-xxxv. 
74 Ibid., I, xxxix, 212.20-23: "Unde, sicut titulus acquirendi non per se sufficit ... sed 
oportet precipue superaddere titulum caritatis, sic indubie nec successio hereditaria nec popularis 
eleccio per se sufficit." 
75 Ibid., I, xxx, 216.12-16: "Sic titulus dominandi ex iure hereditario Christi per graciam 
est prius naturaliter et essencialiter requisitum post lapsum ad hoc quod quis quomodolibet 
dominetur." 
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the throne is to be the king's son through discipleship in Christ, the entire class 
of the apostolically poor are potential aspirants to the duty of civil dominium; 
and the present Grace-favored king is free to make a careful selection among 
the most deserving of these. 
Wyclif believes the civil institution of servitude, in which people are born 
into subjection to a lord, to be a real evil. In his view, just civil dominium is 
stewardship on behalf of the divine Lord, and not mastery, and to suppose that 
anything other than one's having been favored by Grace can determine just 
dominium is folly. True servitude, he argues, is subjection to material needs; 
servants or subjects with caritas have true, natural mastery over their civil lords 
when the lordsare in thrall of material wealth.76 Likewise, true mastery in- 
volves an attitude of love-founded concern for one's subjects, so Wyclifs pic- 
ture of just civil dominium allows more benefits to the subject than to the lord. 
When a lord ceases to devote his concerns to those of his subject, the mastery 
relation ends; the lord is no longer a lord, and the subject no longer subject, and 
no human ordinance can prevent this from occurring.77 As with the inheritance 
of civil dominium in general, cases in which a Grace-less lord inherits the ser- 
vice of subjects can never be just. Thus, Wyclifs reasoning serves to indict 
every lord-subject relation not characterized by a loving reciprocity as having 
no place in a just society. 
Wyclif takes a similar approach regarding tyranny. Throughout De Civili 
Dominio and De Officio Regis he advises those subject to a tyrant to bear up 
obediently under what might well be God's cleansing scourge. "For the Savior 
obeyed the corporeal bidding of Herod, Pilate, and priestly rulers, which other- 
wise he could easily have resisted; all Christ's actions are our instructions, o 
we should obey tyrants...."78 Wyclif's rather terrifying reasons for God's allow- 
ance of earthly tyranny are that tyrants serve to punish the sin of abusing God's 
favor, to provide discipline for the just, and to instruct he faithful that no civil 
office ought to be used to attain God's favor.79 While these admittedly dissatis- 
fying reasons recur throughout Wyclif's discourse on the nature of civil gov- 
ernment, they are not all that he has to say on the topic. 
Implicit to Wyclifs redefinition of lord and subject as reciprocally related 
to one another is the notion that those who serve a lord have a degree of mas- 
tery over their lord. While this idea is most evident in Wyclif's arguments in 
favor of laymen reproving tyrannous priests, it holds true for secular tyrants as 
well. Servants who know the good better than their masters can rightfully dis- 
obey an evil command, he explains; in fact, when fulfilling the evil command 
would be unjust, the righteous subject's duty is to refuse to obey or to dis- 
76 DCD, I, xxxiii, 234-37. 
77 Ibid., I, xxxiv, 243.12-244.2. See also DOR, iv, 79.28-80.3. 
78 DCD, I, xxviii, 199.9-14. 
79 Ibid., I, vi, 42-46. See also DOR, i, 17. 
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obey.80 "If, through the absence of temporal cooperation [one] could destroy 
the power and abuse of the tyrant, we should withdraw our cooperation from 
him."8' There are even extreme cases, Wyclif admits, where the service due the 
especially heinous tyrant is his murder; but he suggests this more to show how 
different are the types of service than to incite anyone to tyrannicide.82 
Finally, Wyclif is wary of legislation and the courts. This does not mean 
that he distrusts law, for all human law that implements divine law is by defini- 
tion just. But human laws that only complicate people's lives or provide for the 
accumulation of wealth at the expense of others are artifices that do not partici- 
pate in the justice of God's law. Wyclif advises the just civil lord to avoid 
making too many laws, despite their apparent convenience, for they contribute 
more to confusion than to order: "... such a multitude of laws would be burden- 
some and useless in rule."83 
One might expect Wyclif to endorse creating civil laws that enforce Chris- 
tian practices. He distinguishes between just civil laws that implement divine 
justice and those that enforce Christian caritas throughout the land, recogniz- 
ing that one cannot expect a law to compel one to do what Grace alone makes 
possible. Rather than force people to give alms to the poor, for example, the 
civil lord should take this duty on himself, for such a deed can really only be 
possible for the caritas-infused heart. While no civil court can rightfully en- 
force such charity, nor can it impede such acts.84 
De Officio Regis and De Civili Dominio contain many of the elements of 
Wyclif's reformative ecclesiology, including his arguments in favor of the com- 
plete divestment of all feudal holdings from any priest, his belief that bishops 
and popes must have absolutely no political power, his indictment of the cor- 
ruption of the papal office, his arguments for the elimination of excommunica- 
tion as a means by which church-members can be controlled, and his well- 
known belief that all Christians must have access to and understanding of the 
Scriptures. We can only make passing reference to these ideas in our brief 
sketch of the aspects of these first treatises of his Summa Theologie indicating 
Wyclif's progressivity. 
Wyclif's political thought, with its foundation in the traditional notion of 
the objective ius, is certainly not comparable to Ockham's or Marsilius's re- 
garding the rights one might expect by virtue of being a human. But it would be 
premature to relegate it to the Museum of Philosophical Curiosities, for it shows 
80 DOR, iv, 82. 
81 DCD, I, xxviii, 201.30-33: "Verumtamen, si esset versimile homini per subtracciones 
temporalis iuvaminis destruere potentatus tyrannidem vel abusum, debet ea intencione 
subtrahere." 
82 DOR, viii, 201.15-19. 
83 Ibid., iii, 56.5-18. 
84 DCD, III, xvi, 303. 
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a tendency towards the kind ofprogressivity that characterizes political thought 
reliant on subjective right. It would be better to conclude that the absence of a 
theory of subjective right in a medieval political thinker does not necessarily 
indicate an approach averse to the modem way; in Wyclif's case, a theory of 
objective ius provides a foundation for a startlingly atypical medieval political 
vision. 
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